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(B) AN OPINION HOLDING THE ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
R. S. SMETHURST*
On appeal from the decision of the District Court the Government contends (i)
that the statute is primarily a regulation of conlmerce, (2) that any regulation of local
matters is secondary and merely incidental, (3) that the local matters so regulated,
namely, wages, hours and the employment of minors, are all matters which directly
and substantially affect interstate commerce, and (4) that the statute does not offend
against the Fifth Amendment.
THE AcT AS A REGULATION OF COMMERCE
In attacking the decision below, the Government has argued that Section i5(a) (I)
of the statute clearly stamps it as a commerce regulation. That Section prohibits the
interstate sale, shipment or delivery of goods produced in violation of Section 6 or 7
of the Act. The same contention is made with respect to Section 12, prohibiting the
interstate sale, shipment or delivery of goods produced in establishments employing
"oppressive child labor." With emphasis upon these provisions, we are told the
statute is obviously a regulation of commerce among the several states and clearly
within constitutional bounds.
Prior decisions of this Court go far toward sustaining this contention. We have
repeated at the risk of becoming trite, that the power to regulate commerce is the
power to prescribe the rule by which that commerce shall be governed. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat. i, 196 (U. S. i824); The Daniel Ball, io Wall. 557, 564 (U. S. 1871);
County of Mobile v. Kimball, I2 U. 5. 691, 696 (i88o). We have gone further. In
recent years this Court on numerous occasions has held that the power to regulate
includes the power to prohibit such commerce. As we said in Kentucky Whip &
Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 299 U. S. 334, 346 (1937):
".... The power to prohibit interstate transportation has been upheld by this Court in
relation to diseased livestock, lottery tickets, commodities owned by the interstate carrier
transporting them, except such as may be required in the conduct of its business as a com-
mon carrier, adulterated and misbranded articles, under the Pure Food and Drug Act,
women, for immoral purposes, intoxicating liquors, diseased plants, stolen motor vehicles,
and kidnaped persons."
This series of decisions found its logical culmination in Mulford v. Smith, 59 Sup.
Ct. 648, decided April 17, 1939. In that case we held that the power to regulate com-
merce included the power to regulate the supply of tobacco to move in interstate
commerce by imposing heavy penalties upon tobacco marketed in excess of quotas
fixed by the Secretary of Agriculture.
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In view of these principles now established it can no longer be argued that the
power to regulate commerce does not include the power to prohibit. Consequently
if the statute before us merely prohibited interstate commerce in forbidden articles,
the argument of the Government would have the support of an imposing and un-
broken line of authority in the cases cited.
While Appellee would distinguish such cases, we are not called upon to do so, for
Appellee relies primarily on the contention that the true import of the statute does
not appear from mere examination of Sections 12 and 15(a) (i) alone. It is argued
that the real regulation prescribed can be determined only by reading those sections
in connection with other portions of the Act. Counsel for Appellee refer in particular
to Section 3 (definitions), Sections 6, 7 and 8 (pertaining to minimum wages and
maximum hours of employment), Section ii (inspections and records), Section 13
(exemptions), Section 14 (pertaining to learners, apprentices and handicapped
workers), Section 15(a), paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) (prohibited acts) and to
Section i6 (penalties).
In the light of these provisions, Appellee contends that the Act is first and fore-
most a regulation of local operations which precede the commerce subject to regula-
tion under Section x5(a) (i). They impress upon us the argument that the chief
purpose and effect of the statute is to regulate wages, hours and other conditions of
employment in local enterprise; that the regulation (prohibition) of commerce is
utilized to enforce or supplement this local regulation. In support of this, Appellee
refers us to the familiar principle that Congress may not, under the guise of an
admitted power, regulate matters not within its constitutional grant of authority.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 423 (U. S. i819) Linder v. United States, 268
U. S. 5, I7 (1925); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330 (i935);
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
The Government would escape the effect of such decisions by urging that this
Court is without authority to examine the motives of Congress or to defeat the exer-
cise of an admitted power by consideration of its incidental effect upon subjects
outside its orbit. Mulford v. Smith, supra.
The issue thus drawn is clear. Is the statute essentially a regulation of interstate
commerce which only incidentally includes subjects local in character or is the statute
primarily a regulation of wages and hours of employment in local enterprise rein-
forced by the prohibition against interstate commerce in articles produced under
lower standards? We think it clearly the latter.
It is true, as the Government contends, that an admitted power cannot be denied
merely because it indirectly or incidentally controls matters which Congress has no
power to regulate directly. While application of this principle has frequently evoked
disagreement, the principle itself has never been disputed. Cf. Mulford v. Smith,
supra; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (i918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U. S. 20 (1922).
Appellee has referred us to the decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra, to justify
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examination of the purposes of the statute now before us as revealed in its back-
ground and legislative history. The Government contends, however, that Hammer v.
Dagenhart has been so modified by subsequent cases that it must now be considered
overruled. We think each argument misconstrues the principle there applied and its
subsequent application under particular circumstances.
The issue before us in the original Child Labor Case was clearly expressed in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes when he said:
"The question, then, is narrowed to whether the exercise of its otherwise constitutional
power by Congress can be pronounced unconstitutional because of its possible reaction
upon the conduct of the states in a matter upon which I have admitted that they are free
from direct control. I should have thought that that matter had been disposed of so fully
as to leave no room for doubt. I' should have thought that the most conspicuous decisions
of this court had made it clear that the power to regulate commerce and other constitu-
tional powers could not be cut down or qualified by the fact that it might interfere with
the carrying out of the domestic policy of any state."
The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Day, expressly recognized that the
Court had "neither authority nor disposition to question the motives of Congress in
enacting this legislation." They did find on the face of the statute a regulation of
"a purely local matter to which the Federal authority does not extend."
Mr. Justice Holmes, and those members of the Court who concurred in his dis-
sent, believed the majority had condemned the statute for an indirect and incidental
local regulation necessarily imposed upon those who would ship their products in
interstate commerce. The minority believed this incidental effect did not make the
statute any less a commerce regulation.
The incidental or speculative effect of the first Child Labor Law appeared as
direct and certain in the Child Labor Tax Law before this Court in Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., supra. After examination of the statute, the Court, through Mr. Chief
Justice Taft, concluded (at page 37) that:
".. . In the light of these features of the act, a court must be blind not to see that the
so-called tax is imposed to stop the employment of children within the age limits prescribed.
Its prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All others can see and
understand this. How can we properly shut our minds to it?"
Criticism of the Dagenhart case has been directed, not against the fundamental
principle underlying it, but against the willingness of that Court to restrain the exer-
cise of the commerce power because of its incidental regulation of production. We
are not now faced with that danger. The incidental local regulation implicit in the
first Child Labor Case is found in the statute before us to be clear, explicit and undis-
guised. Similarly, it bears no resemblance whatever to the Act of Congress sustained
in Mulford v. Smith, supra, wherein we emphasized that:
"The statute does not purport to control production (italics added). It sets no limit
upon the acreage which may be planted or produced and imposes no penalty for the plant-
ing and producing of tobacco in excess of the marketing quota. It purports to be solely a
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regulation of interstate commerce, which it reaches and affects at the throat where tobacco
enters the stream of commerce,--the marketing warehouse."
While the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 expressly prohibits interstate com-
merce in goods produced under the conditions proscribed in Sections 6, 7 and 12, it
does more. Section 6 prohibits employment at less than the stipulated minimum
wages or for hours longer than the specified workweek. While these prohibitions
extend to any employee "engaged in commerce," they also apply to any employee
"engaged in the production of goods for commerce." The term "produced" is defined
in Section 3(J) to include the mining, manufacturing, processing, or handling of
goods, and for the purpose of the Act an employee shall be deemed to be engaged in
production if engaged in "any occupation necessary thereto." The term "goods" is
defined in Section 3 (i) to include articles of commerce of any character, including
"any parts or ingredients thereof.'
Sections 5 and 8 set forth elaborate plans for fixing minimum wages industry by
industry to expedite attainment of the 40 cent minimum ultimately contemplated by
the statute. Section 13 provides for numerous and detailed exemptions and Section ii
requires the keeping of payroll records of information pertinent to any detailed
regulation of wages and hours of employment.
Section 12 prohibits the interstate sale, transportation or delivery of any goods
produced in an establishment in or about which oppressive child labor has been
employed at any time within thirty days prior to removal of the goods. Section 3(l)
defines "oppressive child labor" and vests authority in the Department of Labor to
specify occupations deemed hazardous.
If these provisions leave doubt of the true nature of the regulation, such doubt is
definitely removed by Sections 15 and 16. Section 15(a) (2) declares unlawful the
employment of any person in violation of Section 6 or 1. Paragraph (4) likewise
declares unlawful any act prohibited in Section 12. For these infractions of the law,
Section i6 provides the penalties, criminal and civil, and Section 17 vests jurisdiction
in District Courts to restrain any act or practice prohibited in Section 15.
When employment under the prohibited conditions may lead to imposition of
such penalties, can it be said the statute does not regulate local affairs or that the
regulation of such matters is merely incidental to a primary regulation of commerce?
We think the answer is obvious. The statute regulates far more than subjects here-
tofore included in the broadest concept of commerce. It regulates activities and
practices which are the essence of production, and for which there is no constitutional
' As indicative of the scope of the Act, Appellee has referred us to the views of those charged with
its administration, particularly Interpretative Bulletin No. 5, December 2, 1938, wherein it is stated that:
" .. Employees are engaged in the production of goods for commerce where the employer intends
or hopes or has reason to believe that the goods or any unsegregated part of them will move in inter-
state commerce. If, however, the employer does not intend or hope or have reason to believe that the
goods in production will move in interstate commerce, the fact that the goods ultimately do move in
interstate commerce would not bring employees engaged in the production of these goods within the
purview of the Act .. "
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sanction unless it can be said that these local practices directly and substantially affect
interstate commerce. In Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. I, 2X (i888), we said:
"If it be held that the term (commerce with foreign nations and among the several
states) includes the regulation of all such manufactures as are intended to be the subject of
commercial transactions in the future, it is impossible to deny that it would also include
all productive industries that contemplate the same thing. The result would be that Con-
gress would be invested, to the exclusion of the States, with the power to regulate, not only
manufactures, but also agriculture, horticulture, stock raising, domestic fisheries, mining-
in short, every branch of human industry."
See also, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra, p. 547; Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 304, 317, 327 (1936); and National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 300 U. S. I (1937).
REGULATION OF PRAcTicEs AFFECTING COMMERCE
The Government has anticipated this conclusion by arguing in the alternative
that low wages, excessive hours and the employment of minors directly and sub-
stantially burden interstate commerce. Consequently our attention is directed to
Section 2 of the Act. The Government contends that low wages, long hours and the
employment of minors burden and obstruct commerce and are therefore subject to
regulation. Specific reference is made to the Congressional findings that these labor
conditions lead to labor disputes which burden and obstruct commerce; that their
existence constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce and interferes
with the orderly and fair marketing of goods.
On the basis of these findings, the Government invokes the familiar principle that
Congress may protect commerce from injury arising at any source. While the
standards required by the statute before us are not imposed, as in the National Labor
Relations Act, only when observance of contrary conditions may "affect commerce,"
the Government contends the same result is achieved by Sections 6 and 7 prescribing
wage and hour standards for employees "engaged in the production of goods for
commerce." The authorities relied upon include such landmarks as National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra, and cases therein cited.
Appellee, however, stands squarely upon our decision in Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, supra, and in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra.
Decisions of this Court support with adequate authority the contention of the
Government that the power to regulate commerce includes the power to protect that
commerce from injury from whatever source it comes. No immunity attaches merely
because the injury arises in production or manufacture. While activities may be
local in character when separately considered, they are not thereby removed from
federal control if their relation to interstate commerce is so close and substantial as
to require regulation or restraint to protect that commerce. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, supra; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., supra.
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This Court has constantly emphasized, however, that federal intervention is
justified only if it clearly appears that there is a close and substantial relation be-
tween interstate commerce and the local activities sought to be controlled. Santa Cruz
Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S. 453 (1938); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra. The commerce power cannot be distorted to
bring under federal rule complete control of local affairs which, because of our
growing and complex economic system, create temporary disturbance or dislocations
indirectly affecting interstate commerce. "Activities local in their immediacy do not
become interstate and national because of distant repercussions." Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, supra, p. 554.
The distinction between what is "direct" and "substantial," as contrasted with the
"remote" and "indirect," never has been defined except by degree and the usual
process of inclusion and exclusion. Nevertheless the distinction is real. Upon its
preservation depends continuance of our constitutional system. Santa Cruz Fruit
Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra; National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra.
While imaginary cases may be cited to obscure the line, the facts before us leave
no doubt upon which side this statute must fall. The issue before us now is the same
as that presented in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra, and Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., supra. Neither the facts before us, nor the arguments presented by
the Government have induced us to deviate from our prior decisions. While we have
moved far in recent years toward a broad expansion of federal authority, we are not
at liberty to alter our dual system by interpretation based upon theoretical arguments
of cause and effect.
The soundness of our decision is apparent when we contrast this statute with the
Act of Congress sustained in the Labor Board Cases. In upholding the validity of the
National Labor Relations Act, we were faced with a long record of experience with
labor disputes. That record demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that there
was a direct connection between unfair labor practices causing labor disputes and
restraint upon interstate commerce.
As we stated in the Jones & Laughlin case:
.. it is idle to say that the effect would be indirect or remote. It is obvious that it
would be immediate and might be catastrophic."
Cf. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, supra, and
Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197 (1938).
In the light of history and experience, Congress had ample authority to protect
commerce from the ravages of costly and disruptive strikes, even though the regula-
tory scheme was incomplete and imperfect as a deterrent to ifidustrial strife. Our
decision in the Jones & Laughlin case was the logical advance from previous decisions
under the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Cf. Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925).
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Nevertheless, in each of the decisions in the Labor Act Cases we have carefully
preserved in full vigor the principle applied (and its application) in Schechter Pod-
try Corp. v. United States, supra and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra. Our decision
in those cases was carefully distinguished by the Government in argument upon the
validity of the National Labor Relations Act.2
In the Schechter case we had occasion to pass upon the validity of federal regula-
tion of wages and hours as authorized in the National Industrial Recovery Act. In
that case the Government argued that hours and wages affected prices and that low
wages and long hours, by reducing costs, resulted in price cutting and demoraliza.
tion of the price structure of commodities moving in interstate commerce. Those
arguments were met by a unanimous decision of this Court declaring "that the
attempt ... to fix the hours and wages of employees of defendants in their intrastate
business was not a valid exercise of federal power." In the opinion written by Mr.
Chief Justice Hughes this Court pointed out that:
"... The argument of the government proves too much. If the federal government may
determine the wages and hours of employees in the internal commerce of a State, because
of their relation to cost and prices and their indirect effect upon interstate commerce, it
would seem that a similar control might be exerted over other elements of cost, also affect-
ing prices, such as the number of employees, rents, advertising, methods of doing business,
etc. All the processes of production and distribution that enter into cost could likewise be
controlled. If the cost of doing an intrastate business is in itself the permitted object of
federal control, the extent of the regulation of cost would be a question of discretion and
not of power."
In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Cardozo voiced even more vigorous
objections to this attempted extension of federal power. Referring to the regulation
of wages and hours of labor in intrastate transactions, Justice Cardozo described its
fallacious theory in colorful language:
". .. There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local in the activities of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is com-
municated perceptibly, though minutely, to recording instruments at the center. A society
such as ours 'is an elastic medium which transmits all tremors through its territory; the
only question is of their size.' Per Learned Hand, J., in the court below. The law is not
indifferent to considerations of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do not become
interstate and national because of distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant
may at times be uncertain. Cf. Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. i. There is no penum-
bra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here. To find immediacy or directness here is to
find it almost everywhere. If centripetal forces are to be isolated to the exclusion of the
forces that oppose and counteract them, there will be an end to our federal system."2 The then Solicitor General, Mr. Stanley Reed, in arguing National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., stated: "It is not necessary that the Carter case should be overruled, if this
act is upheld. Nor is it necessary to think that if we can go this far in protecting commerce from
obstructions because of the power to regulate strikes with intent or with the necessary effect of ob-
structing commerce, that we need open the door to go further into control of wages or hours or con-
ditions of labor. It may well be that wages or hours or conditions of labor, as such, are beyond the
power of Congress, because to interfere with them would be a violation of the due-process clause;
or we may say that wages and hours are so distinct and separate from interstate commerce that they
do not have a direct effect upon it under any circumstances, while here the rights of labor which are
protected fit directly into labor conditions which result directly in interferences and obstructions to
interstate commerce." Sair. Doe. No. 52, 75th Cong., ist Sess. (937) 128.
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This separate opinion was concurred in by Mr. Justice Stone.
Fundamentally the same arguments are pressed upon us in the instant case. These
arguments, based upon the Congressional findings and declaration of policy, allege
further that existence of substandard labor conditions leads to labor disputes burden-
ing and obstructing commerce, constitutes an unfair method of competition in com-
merce and interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods. While we may
take judicial knowledge of the fact that labor disputes often involve controversy over
appropriate wage scales and hours of employment, we find nothing in the attempted
regulation of minimum wages which would have even a perceptible tendency to
eliminate the causes of such disputes.
As we said in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Corp., supra:
"Experience has abundantly demonstrated that the recognition of the right of em-
ployees to self-organization and to have representatives of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining is often an essential condition of industrial peace. Refusal
to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an
outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial
notice and requires no citation of instances...."
The purpose of the statute then before us was to diminish the number of such
disputes by affording definite protection to labor's acknowledged right to organize.
The whole machinery of that Act was geared to the accomplishment of that purpose.
The existence of the evil found evidentiary support in the statutory plan enacted to
meet it.
The Fair Labor Standards Act is in no way comparable, and we are not bound by
a mere legislative declaration not effectuated in the slightest degree by the statutory
provisions which follow. This statute is neither drafted nor designed to deal with
labor disputes as such or to eliminate their cause. The statute before us purports to
regulate basic minimum wages. It does not pretend to touch the levels usually in-
volved in controversies between organized labor and employersO Nor does it provide
any machinery whatever for dealing with disputes over wage and hour standards
which may lead to strikes. It does not prohibit unfair labor practices in individual
instances when such practices are found to "affect" commerce. The theory of the
statute is to protect the underprivileged; those to whom the benefits of collective
bargaining have not yet been extended. 4 It proceeds on the general assumption that
payment of less than twenty-five cents an hour directly burdens commerce, irre-
spective of the number of employees receiving less and regardless of the scale of
wages paid above the minimum.
' Studies of the Department of Labor reveal that union agreements covering a substantial portion
of the women's clothing industry provide generally for a 35-hour week; in some instances 37%/ hours.
This industry is cited as one instance "of an almost industry-wide prohibition of overtime work." See
Hours of Work in Collective Agreements (1938) 46 Mo. LAB. Ray. 232.
Another survey discloses that average hourly earnings in this industry are $S.o6 for men and $.56
for women. Average weekly earnings equal $35.52 for men and $17.41 for women. See Women in
Industry (938) 47 id. at 1272.
' In reporting S. 2475, which became the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Committee Report
submitted by Senator Black pointed out that: "It is only those low-wage and long-working-hour in-
dustrial workers, who are helpless victims of their own bargaining weakness, that this bill seeks to
assist to obtain a minimum wage." SaN. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
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The argument that low wages and long hours constitute an unfair method of
competition in commerce has already been adequately answered by this Court in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra qnd Carter v. Carter Coal Co., supra.
While competition may be made unequal by differences in labor costs, that is not
necessarily so. As we pointed out in the Schechter case, the cost of labor is merely one
element in the final cost of articles competing in interstate markets. Payment of low
wages and employment for excessive hours may affect competition in the labor
market, but those unable to bear the greater cost of higher standards suffer most in
bidding for the more skilled and efficient. Such practices affect commerce indirectly,
if at all, only to the extent lower labor costs affect prices. It is common knowledge,
however, that the impact of labor costs on prices is diluted not only by other and
equally important elements of cost, but by factors relating to demand. To sustain
this extension of federal authority requires more than a specious economic theory.
The possible connection between low wages and the price the article will ultimately
bring in the market place is too remote to be direct, and too speculative to be sub-
stantial. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra.5
We must conclude, therefore, that the statute before us is invalid to the extent it
seeks to compel Appellee to observe standards of wages and hours of employment
with respect to its employees engaged in productive operations or occupations neces-
sary thereto. While reluctant to deny effect to Section 12, pertaining to the employ-
ment of minors, we have concluded it likewise cannot survive the test we must apply.
Section 12 does not merely prohibit interstate commerce in goods produced with
the labor of minors. The products of Appellee's establishment would be barred from
commerce even though the minors employed performed duties having only a remote
relationship to actual production. If they are employed "in or about the establish-
ment," the output of that factory would be barred from the channels of interstate
commerce.
The local nature of the regulation is even more apparent upon casual examination
of Section 3, subsections (i) and (1). By defining goods to include "any part or
ingredient," it is obvious that the prohibitions extend far beyond regulation of the
manufacturer or dealer actually shipping a finished product in commerce. Further-
more, the authority vested in the Department of Labor by Section 3(l) (2) belies the
claim that Section 12 is essentially a regulation of interstate commerce. It is local
regulation pure and simple. While it has not been seriously contended that the em-
ployment of minors directly burdens or "affects" commerce, we think it obvious that
any possible effect is too remote and insignificant to sanction federal regulation.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, supra, and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, supra.
5 Even economists disagree on the basic theories involved without considering provable results. Cl.
King, Wage Rates in the General Welfare, and Douglas, The Effect of Wage, Increases Upon Employ.
ment (1939) 29 Am. EcoN. REv., 34 and 138 (No. x, pt. 2). See also, Sargent, Economic Hazards in the
Fair Labor Standards, supra, pp. 422-430.
6 While current information seems to be lacking, we are told that in 1930 some 197,621 minors
under 16 years of age were gainfully employed in non-agricultural occupations, but estimates vary as
to the number in manufacturing or productive enterprise covered by this Act. Statistics recently pub.
lished by the National Industrial Conference Board indicate that approximately 6o,ooo minors under
16 years of age are employed in manufacturing.
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The Government nevertheless urges that we should still give effect to Section 15
and sustain those counts of the indictment based on alleged interstate shipment of
goods produced in violation of Sections 6 and 7. The same contention is made with
reference to Section 12 forbidding interstate traffic in goods produced by oppressive
child labor. The apparent position of the Government is that these Sections stand
alone and are clearly separable from those Sections having no application.
While we must heed the legislative declaration of separability expressed in Section
i9, we cannot sanction imposition of these penalties when the standards upon which
they are based have no application to Appellee. As we have previously stated,
Sections 2 and 15 prohibit interstate traffic in goods produced in violation of Section
6 or 7 or with oppressive child labor defined in Section 3(1). We have found that
these Sections can have no application to the business of Appellee. Consequently it
cannot be said that the products of Appellee were produced in violation of any pro-
vision of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Since the shipment of its products was not
within the prohibitions of Section 12 or i5, its status is no different than would exist
if its operations were expressly exempted by the terms of the statute itself. We are
not, therefore, required to consider the question of separability.
THE FIFTH AMENDIENT AND DUE PRocEss
Appellee has argued also that the statute before us infringes upon fundamental
rights protected by the Fifth Amendment. In the briefs and arguments, the Fair
Labor Standards Act has been distinguished from the minimum wage legislation
sustained in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (i937)-
We are told that the statutory standards for minimum wages and maximum
hours are arbitrarily fixed without reference to the necessities of health and without
any consideration whatever of living costs, competition or other factors required
under any similar state regulation thus far approved. Our attention has likewise
been directed to Section i8 of the Act, interpreted to condemn downward adjust-
ment of wages above the absolute minima imposed by the statute, or the lengthening
of existing hours of work already lower than the statutory standard prescribed. It is
argued with considerable force and merit that the statute is not truly a minimum
wage regulation, but an attempt to regulate all wages.7
While we were impressed with the substance of such contentions, we are not now
called upon to decide their worth. We have already concluded that the Fair Labor
Standards Act can have no application to Appellee or its employees for the reason
that regulation of their wages, hours or employment of minors cannot be sustained
as a regulation of commerce. We will pass upon these further questions if and when
they arise.
The decision of the District Court sustaining the demurrer to the indictment is
hereby affirmed.
7 See U. S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division, Interpretative Bulletin No. 5, October
21, 1938.
